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In comparison to conventional discrete-variable (DV) quantum key distribution (QKD),
continuous-variable (CV) QKD with homodyne/heterodyne measurements has distinct advantages
of lower-cost implementation and affinity to wavelength division multiplexing. On the other hand,
its continuous nature makes it harder to accommodate to practical signal processing, which is always
discretized, leading to lack of complete security proofs so far. Here we propose a tight and robust
method of estimating fidelity of an optical pulse to a coherent state via heterodyne measurements.
We then construct a binary phase modulated CV QKD protocol and prove its security in the finite-
key-size regime against general coherent attacks, based on proof techniques of DV QKD. Such a
complete security proof achieves a significant milestone in exploiting the benefits of CV QKD.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) aims at generating a
secret key shared between two remote legitimate parties
with information-theoretic security, which provides se-
cure communication against an adversary with arbitrary
computational power and hardware technology. Since
the first proposal in 1984 [1], various QKD protocols
have been proposed with many kinds of encoding and
decoding schemes. These protocols are typically classi-
fied into two categories depending on the detection meth-
ods. One of them is called discrete-variable (DV) QKD,
which uses photon detectors and includes earlier proto-
cols such as BB84 [1] and B92 [2] protocols. The other is
called continuous-variable (CV) QKD, which uses homo-
dyne and heterodyne measurements with photo detectors
[3–5]. Although DV QKD is more mature and achieves a
longer distance if photon detectors with low dark count
rates are available, CV QKD has its own distinct ad-
vantages for a short distance. It can be implemented
with components common to coherent optical commu-
nication technology and is expected to be cost-effective.
Excellent spectral filtering capability inherent in homo-
dyne/heterodyne measurements suppresses crosstalk in
wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) channels. This
allows multiplexing of hundreds of QKD channels into
a single optical fiber [6] as well as co-propagation with
classical data channels [7–13], which makes integration
into existing communication network easier.
One major obstacle in putting CV QKD to practical
use is the gap between the employed continuous vari-
ables and mandatory digital signal processing. The CV
QKD protocols are divided into two branches depend-
ing on whether the modulation method of the encoder is
also continuous, or it is discrete. The continuous mod-
ulation protocols usually adopts Gaussian modulation,
in which the sender chooses the complex amplitude of
a coherent-state pulse according to a Gaussian distri-
bution [3–5, 14, 15] (see Ref. [16] for a review). This
allows powerful theoretical tools such as Gaussian opti-
mality [17, 18], and complete security proofs for a finite-
size key and against general attacks have been given
[19]. To implement Gaussian protocols with a digital
random-number generator and digital signal processing,
it is necessary to approximate the continuous distribu-
tion with a constellation composed of a large but finite
number of complex amplitudes [20, 21]. This is where dif-
ficulty arises, and the security analysis has been confined
to the asymptotic regime and collective attacks. The
other branch gives priority to simplicity of the modula-
tion and uses a very small (usually two to four) number
of amplitudes [22–24]. As for the security analysis, the
status is more or less similar to the Gaussian constel-
lation case, and current security proofs are either in the
asymptotic regime against collective attacks [25–28] or in
the finite-size regime but against more restrictive attacks
[29]. Hence, regardless of approaches, a complete secu-
rity proof of CV QKD in the finite-size regime against
general attacks has been a significant milestone yet to be
achieved.
Here we mark the above milestone by proposing a bi-
nary phase-modulated CV QKD protocol with a com-
plete security proof in the finite-size regime against gen-
eral attacks. The key ingredient is a novel estimation
method using heterodyne measurements which is suited
for analysis of confidence region in the finite-size regime.
The outcome of heterodyne measurement, which is un-
bounded, is converted to a bounded value by a smooth
function such that its expectation is proved to be no
larger than the fidelity of the input pulse to a coher-
ent state. This allows us to use a standard technique to
derive a lower bound on the fidelity with a required con-
fidence level in the finite-size regime. The fidelity as a
measure of disturbance in the binary modulated proto-
col is essentially the same as what is monitored through
bit errors in the B92 protocol [2, 30, 31]. This allows
us to construct a security proof based on a reduction to
distillation of entangled qubit pairs [32, 33], which is a
technique frequently used for DV QKD protocols.
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2Results
Estimation of fidelity to a coherent state. We first
introduce a test scheme to estimate the fidelity between
an input optical state ρ and the vacuum state |0〉〈0|
through a heterodyne measurement. For an input state
ρ of a single optical mode, the heterodyne measurement
produces an outcome ωˆ ∈ C with a probability density
qρ(ω) d
2ω := 〈ω| ρ |ω〉 d
2ω
pi
, (1)
where a coherent state |ω〉 is defined as
|ω〉 := e−|ω|2/2
∞∑
n=0
ωn√
n!
|n〉 . (2)
We denote the expectation associated with the distribu-
tion qρ(ω) simply by Eρ. To construct a lower bound
for the fidelity 〈0| ρ |0〉 from ωˆ, we will use the associated
Laguerre polynomials which are given by
L(k)n (µ) := (−1)k
dkLn+k(µ)
dµk
, (3)
where
Ln(µ) :=
eµ
n!
dn
dµn
(e−µµn) (4)
are the Laguerre polynomials. Our test scheme is based
on the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Let Λm,r(µ) be a bounded function given by
Λm,r(µ) := e
−rµ(1 + r)L(1)m ((1 + r)µ), (5)
for an integer m ≥ 0 and a real number r > 0. Then, we
have
Eρ[Λm,r(|ωˆ|2)] = 〈0| ρ |0〉+
∞∑
n=m+1
〈n| ρ |n〉
(1 + r)n
In,m, (6)
where In,m are constants satisfying (−1)mIn,m > 0.
From Eq. (6), a lower bound on the fidelity between ρ
and the vacuum state is given by
Eρ[Λm,r(|ωˆ|2)] ≤ 〈0| ρ |0〉 (m : odd) (7)
for any odd integer m. As seen in Figure 1. a), the abso-
lute value and the slope of the function Λm,r are moder-
ate for small values of m and r, which is advantageous in
executing the test in a finite duration with a finite reso-
lution. Compared to a similar method proposed in [34],
our method excels in its tightness for weak input signals;
we see from Eq. (6) that, regardless of the value of r, the
inequality (7) saturates when ρ has at most m photons.
This is crucial for the use in QKD in which tightness
directly affects the efficiency of the key generation.
Extension to the fidelity to a coherent state |β〉 is
straightforward as
Eρ[Λm,r(|ωˆ − β|2)] ≤ Tr (ρ |β〉〈β|) (m : odd). (8)
Figure 1. Illustration of the test scheme to estimate
the fidelity. a) Example of the test functions used in the
estimation. In general, the range of the function Λm,r gets
larger when m gets larger. b) A schematic description of the
usage of obtained outcomes in heterodyne measurement. In
order to estimate the lower bound on the fidelity to the coher-
ent states |±β〉, the squared distance between the outcome ωˆ
and the objective point (−1)aβ (i.e., |ωˆ − (−1)aβ|2) is used.
The proofs are given in Methods.
Proposed protocol. Based on this fidelity test, we
propose the following discrete-modulated protocol (see
Figure 2). In what follows, Alice and Bob predeter-
mine the number of rounds N , the protocol parame-
ters (µ, psig, ptest, ptrash, β, s), the acceptance probabil-
ity of homodyne measurement fsuc(|x|) (x ∈ R) with
fsuc(0) = 0, and the parameters for the test function
(m, r). We assume all the parameters are positive and
that psig + ptest + ptrash = 1.
1. Alice generates a random bit a ∈ {0, 1} and sends
an optical pulse B in a coherent state with ampli-
tude (−1)a√µ to Bob. She repeats it N times.
2. For each of the received N pulses, Bob chooses
a label from {signal, test, trash} with probabilities
psig, ptest, and ptrash, respectively. According to the
label, Alice and Bob do one of the following proce-
dures.
3[signal] Bob performs a homodyne measurement on
the received optical pulse, and obtains an out-
come xˆ ∈ R. With a probability fsuc(|xˆ|), he
regards the detection to be a “success”, and
defines a bit b = 0 (resp. 1) when sign(xˆ) =
+(−)1. He announces success/failure of the
detection. In the case of a success, Alice
(resp. Bob) keeps a (b) as a sifted key bit.
[test] Bob performs a heterodyne measurement on
the received optical pulse, and obtains an out-
come ωˆ. Alice announces her bit a. Bob cal-
culates the value of Λm,r(|ωˆ − (−1)aβ|2).
[trash] Alice and Bob produce no outcomes.
3. We denote the numbers of “success” and “failure”
signal rounds, test rounds, and trash rounds by
Nˆ suc, Nˆ fail, Nˆ test, and Nˆ trash, respectively. (N =
Nˆ suc + Nˆ fail + Nˆ test + Nˆ trash holds by definition.)
Bob calculates the sum of Λm,r(|ωˆ− (−1)aβ|2) ob-
tained in the Nˆ test test rounds, which we denote by
Fˆ .
4. For error correction, they use (HEC + s
′) bits of
encrypted communication consuming a pre-shared
secret key to do the following. Alice sends Bob HEC
bits of syndrome of a linear code for her sifted key.
Bob reconciles his sifted key accordingly. Alice and
Bob verify the correction by comparing s′ bits via
universal2 hashing [35].
5. Bob computes and announces the final key length
by
Nˆfin = Nˆ suc
(
1− h
(
U(Fˆ , Nˆ trash)/Nˆ suc
))
−s, (9)
where h(x) := −xlog2(x) − (1 − x)log2(1 − x)
is the binary entropy function and the function
U(Fˆ , Nˆ trash) will be specified below. Alice and Bob
apply privacy amplification to obtain the final key.
The net key gain Gˆ per pulse is therefore given by
Gˆ = (Nˆfin −HEC − s′)/N. (10)
Security Proof. We determine a sufficient amount of
the privacy amplification according to Shor and Preskill
[17], which has been widely used for the DV-QKD proto-
cols. We consider an equivalent protocol in which Alice
and Bob determine their sifted key bits a and b by mea-
surement on a pair of qubits. For Alice, we introduce a
qubit A and assume that she entangles it with an optical
pulse B in a state
|Ψ〉AB :=
|0〉A |
√
µ〉
B
+ |1〉A |−
√
µ〉
B√
2
. (11)
Then, Step 1. is equivalent to the preparation of |Ψ〉AB
followed by a measurement of the qubit A on Z basis
{|0〉 , |1〉} to determine the bit value a. For Bob, we
Figure 2. Illustration of the proposed continuous-
variable QKD protocol. Alice generates a random bit a ∈
{0, 1} and sends a coherent state with amplitude (−1)a√µ.
Bob chooses one of the three measurements based on the pre-
determined probability. In the signal round , Bob performs
a homodyne measurement on the received optical pulse and
obtains an outcome xˆ. In the test round, Bob performs a
heterodyne measurement on the received optical pulse and
obtains an outcome ωˆ. In the trash round, he produces no
outcome.
construct a process of probabilistically converting the re-
ceived optical pulse B to a qubit B′ (See Figure 3). Con-
sider a completely positive map defined by
FB→B′(ρB) :=
∫ ∞
0
dxK(x)ρBK
(x)†, (12)
with
K(x) :=
√
fsuc(x) (|0〉B′〈x|B + |1〉B′〈−x|B) . (13)
When the pulse B is in a state ρB , the corresponding pro-
cess succeeds with a probability psuc and then prepares
the qubit B′ in a state ρB′ , where psucρB′ = FB→B′(ρB).
If the qubit B is further measured on Z basis, probabili-
ties of the outcome b = 0, 1 are given by
psuc 〈0| ρB′ |0〉 =
∫ ∞
0
fsuc(x)dx 〈x| ρB |x〉 , (14)
psuc 〈1| ρB′ |1〉 =
∫ ∞
0
fsuc(x)dx 〈−x| ρB |−x〉 , (15)
which shows the equivalence to the signal round in Step 2.
This is illustrated in Figure 3.
Once the qubit pair AB′ are introduced, the amount of
privacy amplification is connected to the so-called phase
error rate. Instead of Z-basis measurements in the equiv-
alent protocol, consider a virtual protocol in which the
qubits are measured on X basis {|±〉 := (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2}.
A pair with outcomes (+,−) or (−,+) is defined to be
a phase error. Let Nˆ sucph be the number of phase errors
among Nˆ suc pairs. If we have a good upper bound eph
on the phase error rate Nˆ sucph /Nˆ
suc, shortening by frac-
tion h(eph) via privacy amplification achieves the security
in the asymptotic limit [32, 36]. To cover the finite-size
4Figure 3. Illustration of Bob’s qubit extraction in
the virtual procedure. Bob performs on the optical pulse
a non-demolition projective measurement, with which the ab-
solute value of the outcome of homodyne measurement |xˆ| is
determined. Then, Bob extracts a qubit B by the operation
F defined in Eq. (12). A Z-basis measurement on this qubit
gives the same sifted key bit b as described in the original
protocol. On the other hand, the X-basis measurement on
this qubit reveals the parity of photon number of the received
optical pulse.
cases as well, our goal is to construct U(Fˆ , Nˆ trash) which
satisfies
Pr
[
Nˆ sucph ≤ U(Fˆ , Nˆ trash)
]
≥ 1−  (16)
for any attack in the virtual protocol. It is known that
it immediately implies that the actual protocol can be
made sec-secure with a small security parameter sec =√
2
√
+ 2−s + 2−s
′
[36, 37]. See Methods for the detailed
definition of security.
At this point, it is beneficial for the analysis of the
phase error statistics to clarify what property of the op-
tical pulse B is measured by Bob’s X-basis measure-
ment (see Figure 3). Let Πev(od) be the projection to
the subspace with even (resp. odd) photon numbers.
(Πev +Πod = 1B holds by definition.) Furthermore, since
Πev − Πodd is the operator for an optical phase shift of
pi, we have (Πev − Πodd) |x〉 = |−x〉. Eq. (13) is then
rewritten as
K(x) =
√
2fsuc(x) (|+〉B′〈x|B Πev + |−〉B′〈x|B Πod) .
(17)
Therefore, the probability of obtaining +(−) in the X-
basis measurement is given by
〈+(−)| FB→B′(ρB) |+(−)〉 = Tr
(
ρBM
suc
ev(od)
)
, (18)
where
M sucev(od) :=
∫ ∞
0
2fsuc(x)dxΠev(od) |x〉B〈x|Πev(od). (19)
This shows that Bob’s X-basis measurement distin-
guishes the parity of the photon number of the received
pulse. In this sense, the secrecy of our protocol is as-
sured by the complementarity between the sign of the
quadrature and the parity of the photon number.
For the construction of U(Fˆ , Nˆ trash), we consider a
modified scenario as follows.
1’. Alice prepares a qubit A and an optical pulse B
in a state |Ψ〉AB defined in (11). She repeats it N
times.
2’. According to the label announced by Bob in the
same way as in Step 2., Alice and Bob do one of
the following procedures.
[signal] Bob makes a measurement on the received
pulse B specified by measurement operators
{M sucev ,M sucod , 1 −M sucev −M sucod } to determine
success/failure of detection, and the parity
b′ = even/odd upon success. He announces
success/failure of detection. Alice measures
her qubit A on X basis to obtain a′ = +/−.
[test] Bob performs a heterodyne measurement on
the received optical pulse, and obtains an out-
come ωˆ. Alice announces her bit a. Bob cal-
culates the value of Λm,r(|ωˆ − (−1)aβ|2).
[trash] Alice measures her qubit A on X basis to ob-
tain a′ = +/−.
3’. Nˆ suc, Nˆ trash, and Fˆ are defined as in Step 3. Let
Nˆ sucph be the number of rounds in the Nˆ
suc success
rounds with (a′, b′) = (+, odd) or (−, even). Let
Qˆ− be the number of rounds in the Nˆ trash trash
rounds with a′ = −.
When the adversary adopts the same attack strategy
on the virtual protocol and the modified scenario, the
marginal joint probability of (Nˆ sucph , Fˆ , Nˆ
trash) should be
the same. Hence it suffices to prove Eq. (16) for the
modified scenario.
In order to bound Nˆ sucph , we seek an upper bound on a
linear combination of variables,
Tˆ [κ, γ] := p−1sig Nˆ
suc
ph + p
−1
testκFˆ − p−1trashγQˆ− (20)
with coefficients κ, γ ≥ 0 which are independent of the
observed values of Fˆ and Nˆ trash. First, the expectation
E
[
Tˆ [κ, γ]
]
can be bounded as follows. Let ρAB be the
state of the qubit A and the received pulse B averaged
over N pairs, and define relevant operators as
M sucph := |+〉〈+|A ⊗M sucod + |−〉〈−|A ⊗M sucev , (21)
Πfid := |0〉〈0|A ⊗ |β〉〈β|B + |1〉〈1|A ⊗ |−β〉〈−β|B , (22)
Π± := |±〉〈±|A ⊗ 1B , (23)
5and
M [κ, γ] := M sucph + κΠfid − γΠ−. (24)
Then we immediately have
E[Nˆ sucph ] = psigN Tr
(
ρABM
suc
ph
)
(25)
and
E[Qˆ−] = ptrashN Tr (ρABΠ−) , (26)
while application of the property of Eq. (8) leads to
E[Fˆ ] ≤ ptestN Tr (ρABΠfid) . (27)
Hence we have E
[
Tˆ [κ, γ]
] ≤ N Tr (ρABM [κ, γ]). If we
can find a constant B(κ, γ) ∈ R satisfying the operator
inequality
M [κ, γ] ≤ B(κ, γ)1AB , (28)
we obtain a bound E
[
Tˆ [κ, γ]
] ≤ NB(κ, γ), which is inde-
penedent of ρAB . An easily computable bound B(κ, γ)
is derived in Methods. Then we expect that
Tˆ [κ, γ] ≤ NB(κ, γ) + δ1(/2) (29)
holds with a probability no smaller than 1−/2. Here, the
term δ1(/2) ofO(
√
N) allows for fluctuations from finite-
size effects, and is determined by using Azuma’s inequal-
ity [38] (see Methods). Although Eq. (20) includes Qˆ−
which is inaccessible in the actual protocol, we can derive
a bound by noticing that it is an outcome from Alice’s
qubits and is independent of the adversary’s attack. In
fact, given Nˆ trash, it is the tally of Nˆ trash Bernoulli trials
with a probability ‖ 〈−|A |Ψ〉AB ‖2 = (1− e−2µ)/2 =: q−.
Hence, we can derive an inequality of the form
Qˆ− ≤ q−Nˆ trash + δ2(/2; Nˆ trash) (30)
which holds with a probability no smaller than 1 − /2.
Here δ2(/2; Nˆ
trash) can be determined by a Chernoff
bound (see Methods). Combining Eqs. (20), (29), and
(30), we obtain U(Fˆ , Nˆ trash) satisfying Eq. (16) to com-
plete the finite-size security proof.
Numerical Simulation. We simulated the net key gain
per pulse Gˆ as a function of transmissivity of the optical
path η (including the efficiency of Bob’s apparatus). We
assume a channel model with a loss with transmissivity
η and an excess noise for Bob’s apparatus with which
the received state is displaced randomly to increase the
variance by a factor of 1 + ξ. We assume a step function
with a threshold xth(> 0) as the acceptance probability
fsuc(|x|). The expected amplitude of coherent state β is
chosen to be
√
ηµ. We set sec = 2
−50 for the security
parameter, and set  = 2−s = 2sec/16 and 2
−s′ = sec/2.
We thus have two coefficients (κ, γ), four protocol pa-
rameters (µ, xth, psig, ptest), and two parameters (m, r) of
Figure 4. The net key gain per pulse Gˆ (key rate) as
a function of transmissivity of the optical path. We
assumed that the optical pulse which Bob receives is randomly
displaced coherent state with a Gaussian distribution with
the variance ξ/2. a) The asymptotic key rate for the different
values of ξ. b) The key rate for the different values of ξ when
the pulse number is finite (N = 1011). c) The key rate without
the excess noise (ξ = 0). d) The key rate with the excess noise
of ξ = 10−3.0.
6the test function to be determined. For each transmis-
sivity η, we determined (κ, γ) via a convex optimization
using the CVXPY 1.0.25 [39, 40] and (µ, xth, psig, ptest)
via the Nelder-Mead in the scipy.minimize library in
Python, in order to maximize the key rate. Furthermore,
we adopted m = 1 and r = 0.412019, which leads to
(maxΛm,r,minΛm,r) = (2.82404,−0.993162). See Meth-
ods for the detail of the model of our numerical simula-
tion.
Figure 4 shows the key rates of our protocol in the
asymptotic limit N →∞ and finite-size cases with N =
109–1012 for ξ = 10−2.0–10−3.0 and 0. For the noiseless
model (ξ = 0), the asymptotic rate reaches η = 0.2.
In the case of ξ = 10−3.0, it reaches η = 0.4, which is
comparable to the result of a similar binary modulation
protocol [25]. As for finite-size key rates, we see that the
noiseless model shows a significant finite-size effect even
for N = 1012. On the other hand, with a presence of
noises (ξ = 10−3.0) the effect becomes milder, and N =
1011 is enough to achieve a rate close to the asymptotic
case.
Discussion. Numerically simulated key rates above
were computed on the implicit assumption that Bob’s
observed quantities are processed with infinite preci-
sion. Even when these are approximated with a finite
set of discrete points, we can still prove the security
with minimal degradation of key rates. For the het-
erodyne measurement used for the test in the protocol,
assume that a digitized outcome ωdig ensures that the
true value ωˆ lies in a range Ω(ωdig). Then, we need
only to replace Λm,r(|ωˆ ± β|2) with its worst-case value,
min{Λm,r(|ωˆ ± β|2) : ωˆ ∈ Ω(ωdig)}. As seen in Fig-
ure 1. a), the slope of function Λm,r(µ) is moderate and
goes to zero for µ → ∞. This means that the worst-
case value can be made close to the true value, leading
to small influence on the key rate. For the homodyne
measurement used for the signal, finite precision can be
treated through appropriate modification of the accep-
tance probability fsuc(x). Aside from a very small change
in the success rate and the bit error rate, this function
affects the key rate only through integrals in Eqs. (101),
(103), and (105) in Methods, and hence influence on the
key rate is expected to be small. We thus believe that
the fundamental obstacles associated with the analogue
nature of the CV protocol have been settled by our ap-
proach.
To improve the presented key rate, increasing the num-
ber of states from two seems to be a promising route.
Our fidelity test can be straightforwardly generalized to
monitoring of such a larger constellation of signals, and
we will be able to confine the adversary’s attacks more
tightly than in the present binary protocol. As for the
proof techniques to determine the amount of privacy am-
plification, there are two possible directions. One is to
generalize the present DV-QKD inspired approach of es-
timating the number of phase errors in qubits to the case
of qudits. The other direction is to seek a way to combine
the existing analyses [27, 28, 41] of discrete modulation
CV-QKD protocols, which have been reported to yield
high key rates in the asymptotic regime, to our fidelity
test.
In summary, we proved the security of a binary-
modulated CV QKD protocol in the finite-size regime
while completely circumventing the problems arising
from the analogue nature of CV-QKD. We believe that
it is a significant milestone toward real-world implemen-
tation of CV-QKD, which has its own advantages.
Methods
Proof of Theorem 1 and Eq. (8). From Eq. (1), the
expectation value of Λm,r(|ωˆ|2) when given a measured
state ρ is given by
Eρ[Λm,r
(|ωˆ|2)]
=
∫
ω∈C
Λm,r
(|ω|2) qρ(ω) d2ω
=
∫ ∞
0
dµΛm,r(µ)
(∫ 2pi
0
dθ
2pi
〈√µeiθ| ρ |√µeiθ〉
)
=
∫ ∞
0
dµΛm,r(µ)
( ∞∑
n=0
µne−µ
n!
〈n| ρ |n〉
)
=
∞∑
n=0
〈n| ρ |n〉 In,m
(1 + r)n
, (31)
where
In,m :=
1
n!
∫ ∞
0
dµ e−µµnL(1)m (µ) (32)
for integers n,m ≥ 0.
One can show the following three properties with re-
gard to In,m:
(i) In,m = 0 for m ≥ n ≥ 1.
This results from orthogonality relations of the associated
Laguerre polynomials, that is,∫ ∞
0
L(1)n (µ)L
(1)
m (µ)µe
−µ dµ = (n+ 1)δn,m. (33)
Since the polynomial µn−1 can be written as a linear com-
bination of lower order polynomials {L(1)l (µ)}0≤l≤n−1,
In,m vanishes whenever m ≥ n ≥ 1.
(ii) (−1)mIn,m > 0 for n > m ≥ 0.
This property is shown as follows. First, the associated
Laguerre polynomials satisfy the following recurrence re-
lation for m ≥ 1 [42]:
mL(1)m (µ) = µ
dL
(1)
m
dµ
(µ) + (m+ 1)L
(1)
m−1(µ). (34)
Substituting this to Eq. (32) and using integration by
parts, we have
In,m =
n+m
n
In−1,m − m+ 1
n
In−1,m−1. (35)
7for n ≥ 1 and m ≥ 1. The property (ii) is then proved by
induction overm. Form = 0, it is true since In,0 = 1 > 0.
When (−1)m−1In,m−1 > 0 for n > m − 1, we can prove
(−1)mIn,m > 0 for n > m by using Eq. (35) recursively
with Im,m = 0 from property (i).
(iii) I0,m = 1 for m ≥ 0.
This also follows from property (i) and Eq. (35) for n = 1
and m ≥ 1, which leads to I0,m = I0,0 = 1.
Properties (i), (ii), and (iii) prove Theorem 1. Eq. (7)
immediately follows. Because of the property (ii),
Eρ[Λm,r(µ)] is always less than c0 = F (|0〉〈0| , ρ) when
m is odd, that is, for an arbitrary state ρ and an odd
integer m, we have
Eρ[Λm,r(µ)] ≤ Tr (ρ |0〉〈0|) . (36)
The generalization to the fidelity to a coherent state
|β〉 is justified in the following way. Let Dβ be the dis-
placement operator satisfying
Dβ |0〉〈0|D†β = |β〉〈β| , (37)
and D†β = D−β . With ρ˜ := DβρD
†
β , we have qρ˜(ω) =
qρ(ω − β), which implies that
Eρ˜[Λm,r(|ωˆ − β|2)] = Eρ[Λm,r(|ωˆ|2)]
≤ 〈0| ρ |0〉
= 〈β| ρ˜ |β〉 . (38)
Replacing ρ˜ with ρ, we obtain Eq. (8).
Definition of security in the finite-size regime. We
evaluate the secrecy of the final key as follows. When the
final key length is Nˆfin ≥ 1, we represent Alice’s final key
and an adversary’s quantum system as a joint state
ρfin
AE|Nˆ fin =
2Nˆ
fin−1∑
z=0
Pr(z) |z〉 〈z|A ⊗ ρfinE|Nˆ fin(z), (39)
and define the corresponding ideal state as
ρideal
AE|Nˆ fin =
2Nˆ
fin−1∑
z=0
2−Nˆ
fin |z〉 〈z|A ⊗ TrA(ρfinAE|Nˆ fin). (40)
Let ‖σ‖1 = Tr
√
σ†σ be the trace norm of an operator σ.
We say a protocol is sct-secret when
1
2
∑
Nˆ fin≥1
Pr(Nˆfin)‖ρfin
AE|Nˆ fin − ρidealAE|Nˆ fin‖1 ≤ sct (41)
holds regardless of the adversary’s attack. It is known
[37] that if the number of phase errors is bounded as
shown in Eq. (16), the protocol with Eq. (9) is sct-secret
with sct =
√
2
√
+ 2−s.
For correctness, we say a protocol is cor-correct if the
probability for Alice’s and Bob’s final key to differ is
bounded by cor. Our protocol achieves cor = 2
−s′ via
the verification in Step 4.
When the above two conditions are met, the protocol
becomes sec-secure with sec = sct + cor in the sense of
universal composability [43].
Derivation of the operator inequality. Here we
construct B(κ, γ) which fulfills the operator inequality
(28). Let us denote the supremum of the spectrum of a
bounded self-adjoint operator O by σsup(O). Although
σsup(M [κ, γ]) would give a tightest bound, it is hard
to compute numerically since system B has an infinite-
dimensional Hilbert space. Instead, we derive a looser
but simpler bound.
To make use of the symmetry in the problem, we aim
at bounding another operator M ′[κ, γ+, γ−] defined by
M ′[κ, γ+, γ−] := M sucph + κΠfid − γ+Π+ − γ−Π−, (42)
We see that
M [κ, γ] = M ′[κ, 0, γ]. (43)
Let us introduce projection operators by
Π±,ev(od) := |±〉〈±|A ⊗Πev(od), (44)
where Πev(od) is defined in the main text. Let us further
introduce orthogonal states as
|φerr〉AB := |+〉A ⊗Πod |β〉B + |−〉A ⊗Πev |β〉B , (45)
|φcor〉AB := |−〉A ⊗Πod |β〉B + |+〉A ⊗Πev |β〉B . (46)
One can check that
Πfid = |φerr〉〈φerr|+ |φcor〉〈φcor| (47)
holds by using (Πev − Πod) |β〉B = |−β〉B . We can then
decompose M ′[κ, γ+, γ−] into a direct sum of two oper-
ators as follows:
M ′[κ, γ+, γ−] = Merr ⊕Mcor, (48)
where
Merr := M
suc
ph + κ |φerr〉〈φerr| − γ+Π+,od − γ−Π−,ev,
(49)
Mcor := κ |φcor〉〈φcor| − γ+Π+,ev − γ−Π−,od. (50)
We define an orthonormal basis {|e(j)ev 〉 , |e(j)od 〉}∞j=1
through the following equations:√
Cev(od) |e(1)ev(od)〉B = Πev(od) |β〉B , (51)
M sucev(od) |e(1)ev(od)〉B
= Dev(od) |e(1)ev(od)〉B +
√
Vev(od) |e(2)ev(od)〉B ,
(52)
∞∑
j=1
|e(j)ev(od)〉〈e(j)ev(od)| = Πev(od). (53)
8The normalization factors in Eq. (52) are explicitly given
by
Cev := 〈β|Πev |β〉 = e−|β|2 cosh |β|2, (54)
Cod := 〈β|Πod |β〉 = e−|β|2 sinh |β|2, (55)
Dev(od) := C
−1
ev(od) 〈β|M sucev(od) |β〉 , (56)
Vev(od) := C
−1
ev(od) 〈β|
(
M sucev(od)
)2 |β〉 −D2ev(od). (57)
These quantities can be numerically computed by inte-
gration through Eq. (19). We further define the following
projectors:
Π
(j)
ev(od)
:= |e(j)ev(od)〉〈e(j)ev(od)| (j = 1, 2), (58)
Π
(≥3)
ev(od)
:= Πev(od) −Π(1)ev(od) −Π(2)ev(od). (59)
Since Eq. (56) implies Π
(1)
odM
suc
od Π
(≥3)
od = 0, we have
M sucod = Π
(1)
odM
suc
od Π
(1)
od + Π
(≥2)
od M
suc
od Π
(≥2)
od
+ Π
(1)
odM
suc
od Π
(2)
od + Π
(2)
odM
suc
od Π
(1)
od .
(60)
The last term is bounded as
Π
(≥2)
od M
suc
od Π
(≥2)
od ≤ Π(≥2)od (61)
since M sucod ≤ 1B . Combining Eqs. (56), (60), and (61),
we have
M sucod − γ+Πod
≤ (Dod − γ+) |e(1)od 〉〈e(1)od |+ (1− γ+) |e(2)od 〉〈e(2)od |
+
√
Vod(|e(2)od 〉〈e(1)od |+ |e(1)od 〉〈e(2)od |) + (1− γ+)Π(≥3)od .
(62)
In the same way, by replacing + ↔ − and od ↔ ev, we
have
M sucev − γ−Πev
≤ (Dev − γ−) |e(1)ev 〉〈e(1)ev |+ (1− γ−) |e(2)ev 〉〈e(2)ev |
+
√
Vev(|e(2)ev 〉〈e(1)ev |+ |e(1)ev 〉〈e(2)ev |) + (1− γ−)Π(≥3)ev .
(63)
Using Eqs. (62) and (63), we can bound the operator
Merr in Eq. (49) as
Merr ≤M r-4err [κ, γ+, γ−]⊕ (1− γ+)Π(≥3)+,od⊕ (1− γ−)Π(≥3)−,ev,
(64)
with a rank-4 operator
M r-4err [κ, γ
+, γ−]
:= κ |φerr〉〈φerr|
+ (Dod − γ+) |e(1)+,od〉〈e(1)+,od|+ (1− γ+) |e(2)+,od〉〈e(2)+,od|
+
√
Vod(|e(2)+,od〉〈e(1)+,od|+ |e(1)+,od〉〈e(2)+,od|)
+ (Dev − γ−) |e(1)−,ev〉〈e(1)−,ev|+ (1− γ−) |e(2)−,ev〉〈e(2)−,ev|
+
√
Vev(|e(2)−,ev〉〈e(1)−,ev|+ |e(1)−,ev〉〈e(2)−,ev|),
(65)
where
Π
(≥3)
±,od(ev) := |±〉〈±|A ⊗Π(≥3)od(ev) (66)
and
|e(j)±,od(ev)〉AB := |±〉A |e
(j)
od(ev)〉B . (67)
Using the basis {|e(2)+,od〉 , |e(1)+,od〉 , |e(1)−,ev〉 , |e(2)−,ev〉}, we
have a matrix representation of M r-4err [κ, γ
+, γ−] defined
in Eq. (65) as follows:
1− γ+ √Vod√
Vod κCod +Dod− γ+ κ
√
Cod Cev
κ
√
Cod Cev, κCev +Dev− γ−
√
Vev√
Vev 1− γ−
 .
(68)
As for Mcor, it has a simpler decomposition:
Mcor = M
r-2
cor[κ, γ
+, γ−]⊕ (−γ+)Π(≥2)+,ev ⊕ (−γ−)Π(≥2)−,od,
(69)
where a rank-2 operator M r-2cor[κ, γ
+, γ−] is given by,
M r-2cor[κ, γ
+, γ−]
:= κ |φcor〉〈φcor| − γ+ |e(1)+,ev〉〈e(1)+,ev| − γ− |e(1)−,od〉〈e(1)−,od|
=
[
κCev − γ+ κ
√
Cev Cod
κ
√
Cev Cod κCod − γ−
]
, (70)
where we used the basis {|e(1)+,ev〉 , |e(1)−,od〉} for the matrix
representation.
Finally, from Eqs. (43), (48), (64), and (69), we obtain
an upper bound on σsup(M [κ, γ]) as
σsup(M [κ, γ]) = σsup(M
′[κ, 0, γ]) ≤ B(κ, γ), (71)
with
B(κ, γ)
:= max
{
σsup
(
M r-4err [κ, 0, γ]
)
, σsup
(
M r-2cor[κ, 0, γ]
)
, 1
}
,
(72)
where we used γ ≥ 0. Since M r-4cor and M r-2err are four-
dimensional and two-dimensional matrices, their largest
eigenvalues can be numerically calculated.
Derivation of the finite size bound. Here we con-
struct the function U(Fˆ , Nˆ trash) to satisfy Eq. (16) in the
modified scenario. For that, we will first derive Eq. (29).
In the modified scenario, we define the following random
variables labeled by the number i of the round;
(i) Nˆ
suc,(i)
ph is defined to be unity only when “signal”
is chosen in the i-th round, the detection is a “suc-
cess”, and a pair of outcomes (a′, b′) is (+, odd) or
(−, even). Otherwise, Nˆ suc,(i)ph = 0. We have
Nˆ
suc,(i)
ph =

1
(
signal, success,
(+, odd) or (−, even))
0 (otherwise)
, (73)
and Nˆ sucph =
∑N
i=1 Nˆ
suc,(i)
ph .
9(ii) Fˆ (i) is defined to be Λm,r(|ωˆ − (−1)aβ|2) when
“test” is chosen in the i-th round. We have
Fˆ (i) =
{
Λm,r(|ωˆ − (−1)aβ|2) (test)
0 (otherwise)
, (74)
and Fˆ =
∑N
i=1 Fˆ
(i).
(iii) Qˆ
(i)
− is defined to be unity only when “trash” is
chosen in the i-th round and a′ = −. Otherwise,
Qˆ
(i)
− = 0. We have
Qˆ
(i)
− =
{
1 (trash, −)
0 (otherwise)
, (75)
and Qˆ− =
∑N
i=1 Qˆ
(i)
− .
(iv) We also define
Tˆ (i) := p−1sig Nˆ
suc,(i)
ph +p
−1
testκFˆ
(i)−p−1trashγQˆ(i)− , (76)
which leads to Tˆ [κ, γ] =
∑N
i=1 Tˆ
(i).
We will make use of Azuma’s inequality [38]. We define
stochastic processes {Xˆ(k)}k=0,...,N and {Yˆ (k)}k=1,...,N
as follows:
Xˆ(0) := 0, (77)
Xˆ(k) :=
k∑
i=1
(
Tˆ (i) − Yˆ (i)) (k ≥ 1), (78)
Yˆ (k) := E
[
Tˆ (k)
∣∣Xˆ<k], (79)
where Xˆ<k := (Xˆ(0), Xˆ(1), . . . , Xˆ(k−1)). Note that Yˆ (k)
is a constant when conditioned on Xˆ<k. Such a se-
quence {Yˆ (k)}k=1,2,... is called a predictable process with
regards to {Xˆ(k)}. Since Tˆ (i) is bounded for any i and
{Xˆ(k)}k=0,1,... is a martingale, we can apply Azuma’s in-
equality.
Proposition (Generalized Azuma’s inequality [44, 45]):
Suppose {Xˆ(k)}k=0,1,... is a martingale which satisfies
− Yˆ (k) + cmin ≤ Xˆ(k) − Xˆ(k−1) ≤ −Yˆ (k) + cmax, (80)
for constants cmin and cmax, and a predictable process
{Yˆ (k)}k=1,2,... with regards to {Xˆ(k)}, i.e., Yˆ (k) is con-
stant when conditioned on Xˆ<k. Then, for all positive
integers N and all positive reals δ,
Pr[Xˆ(N)−Xˆ(0) ≥ δ] ≤ exp
(
− 2δ
2
(cmax − cmin)2N
)
. (81)
We define constants cmin and cmax as follows. In each
round, at most one of Nˆ
suc,(i)
ph , Fˆ
(i), and Qˆ
(i)
− takes non-
zero value; Nˆ
suc,(i)
ph and Qˆ
(i)
− are either zero or unity, and
minΛm,r ≤ Fˆ (i) ≤ maxΛm,r. Since κ, γ ≥ 0, Eq. (80)
holds when cmin and cmax are defined as
cmin := min
(
p−1testκ minΛm,r, −p−1trashγ, 0
)
, (82)
cmax := max
(
p−1sig , p
−1
testκ maxΛm,r, 0
)
. (83)
With cmin and cmax defined as above, we further define
δ1() := (cmax − cmin)
√
N
2
ln
(
1

)
. (84)
Setting δ = δ1(/2) in the proposition, we conclude that
Tˆ [κ, γ] ≤
N∑
i=1
Yˆ (i) + δ1(/2) (85)
holds with a probability no smaller than 1− /2.
Next, we will construct a deterministic bound on Yˆ (i).
Let ρ
(i)
AB be the state of Alice’s i-th qubit and Bob’s i-th
pulse conditioned on Xˆ<i. Then, using the same argu-
ment as that has lead to Eqs. (25)–(27), we have
E
[
Nˆ
suc,(i)
ph
∣∣∣Xˆ<i] = psigTr(ρ(i)ABM sucph ) , (86)
E
[
Qˆ
(i)
−
∣∣∣Xˆ<i] = ptrashTr(ρ(i)ABΠ−) , (87)
E[Fˆ (i)|Xˆ<i] ≤ pfidTr
(
ρ
(i)
ABΠfid
)
, (88)
and thus
Yˆ (i) ≤ Tr
(
ρ
(i)
ABM [κ, γ]
)
, (89)
where M [κ, γ] is defined in Eq. (24). Using the operator
inequality (28), we obtain a bound independent of i as
Yˆ (i) ≤ B(κ, γ). (90)
Combining this with Eq. (85) proves Eq. (29).
The function δ2(/2; Nˆ
trash) satisfying the bound (30)
on Qˆ− can be derived from the fact that Pr[Qˆ−|Nˆ trash]
is a binomial distribution. The following inequality thus
holds for any positive integer n and a real δ with 0 < δ <
(1− q−)n (Chernoff bound):
Pr
[
Qˆ− − q−n ≥ δ
∣∣∣Nˆ trash = n]
≤ exp [−nD(q− + δ/n∥∥q−)] , (91)
where
D(x‖y) := xlogx
y
+ (1− x)log1− x
1− y (92)
is the Kullback-Leibler divergence. On the other hand,
for any non-negative integer n, we always have
Pr
[
Qˆ− − q−n ≤ (1− q−)n
∣∣∣Nˆ trash = n] = 1. (93)
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Therefore, for any non-negative integer n, by defining
δ2(;n) which satisfies{
exp
[−nD(q− + δ2(;n)/n∥∥q−)] =  ( > qn−)
δ2(;n) = (1− q−)n ( ≤ qn−)
,
(94)
and by combining Eq. (91) and (93), we conclude that
Eq. (30) holds with a probability no smaller than 1−/2.
Combining Eq. (29) and Eq. (30), we obtain Eq. (16)
by setting
U(Fˆ , Nˆ trash)
:= psigNB(κ, γ) + psigδ1(/2)
− psig
ptest
κFˆ +
psig
ptrash
γ
(
q−Nˆ trash + δ2(/2; Nˆ trash)
)
(95)
which holds with a probability no smaller than 1 − 
(Union bound).
Model of the quantum channel and measurement
for the calculation of key rates. In what follows, we
normalize quadrature x such that a coherent state |ω〉 has
expectation 〈x〉 = Re(ω) and variance 〈(∆x)2〉 = 1/4.
The wave function for ω = ωR + iωI is given by
〈x|ω〉 =
(
2
pi
) 1
4
exp
[−(x−ωR)2 + 2iωIx− iωRωI]. (96)
For the simulation of the key rate G, we assume that
the communication channel and Bob’s detection appara-
tus can be modeled by a pure loss channel followed by
random displacement, that is, the states which Bob re-
ceives are given by
ρ
(a)
model :=
∫
C
pξ(γ) |(−1)a√ηµ+ γ〉〈(−1)a√ηµ+ γ| d2γ,
(97)
where η is the transmissivity of the pure loss channel and
pξ(γ) is given by
pξ(γ) :=
2
piξ
e−2|γ|
2/ξ. (98)
The parameter ξ is the excess noise relative to the vac-
uum, namely, 〈
(∆x)2
〉
ρ
(a)
model
= (1 + ξ)/4. (99)
We assume that Bob sets β =
√
ηµ for the fidelity
test. The actual fidelity between Bob’s objective state
|(−1)a√ηµ〉 and the model state ρ(a)model is given by
F (ρ
(a)
model, |(−1)a
√
ηµ〉〈(−1)a√ηµ|)
=
∫
C
pξ(γ)| 〈(−1)a√ηµ|(−1)a√ηµ− γ〉 |2dγ
=
1
1 + ξ/2
. (100)
For the acceptance probability of Bob’s measurement in
the signal rounds, we assume fsuc(x) = Θ(|x| − xth), a
step function with the threshold xth > 0. In this case,
the quantities defined in Eqs. (56) and (57) are given by
Dev =
∫ ∞
0
2C−1ev fsuc(x)
∣∣〈x|Πev |β〉∣∣2dx (101)
=
1
4Cev
[
erfc
(√
2(xth − β)
)
+ erfc
(√
2(xth + β)
)
+ 2e−2β
2
erfc
(√
2xth
)]
,
(102)
Dod =
∫ ∞
0
2C−1od fsuc(x)
∣∣〈x|Πod |β〉∣∣2dx (103)
=
1
4Cod
[
erfc
(√
2(xth − β)
)
+ erfc
(√
2(xth + β)
)
− 2e−2β2erfc(√2xth)],
(104)
Vev(od) =
∫ ∞
0
2C−1ev(od)
(
fsuc(x)
)2∣∣〈x|Πev(od) |β〉∣∣2dx
−D2ev(od)
(105)
= Dev(od) −D2ev(od), (106)
where β =
√
ηµ and the complementary error function
erfc(x) is defined as
erfc(x) :=
2√
pi
∫ ∞
x
dt e−t
2
. (107)
For the derivation of Eq. (105), we used the fact that
Πev + Πod = 1 and (Πev −Πod) |β〉 = |−β〉.
We assume that the number of “success” signal rounds
Nˆ suc is equal to its expectation value,
E[Nˆ suc] =
(∫ ∞
−∞
f(|x|) 〈x| ρ(a)model |x〉 dx
)
psigN
= psigN(P
+ + P−), (108)
where
P± :=
∫ ∞
xth
〈±(−1)ax| ρ(a)model |±(−1)ax〉 dx
=
1
2
erfc
(
(xth ∓√ηµ)
√
2
1 + ξ
)
. (109)
We also assume that the number of test rounds Nˆ test is
equal to ptestN and the number of trash rounds Nˆ
trash is
equal to ptrashN . The test outcome Fˆ is assumed to be
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equal to its expectation value E[Fˆ ], which is given by
E[Fˆ ]
= ptestN Eρ(a)model [Λm,r(|ωˆ − (−1)
a√ηµ|2)]
= ptestN
∫
C
d2ω
pi
〈ω| ρ(a)model |ω〉Λm,r(|ω − (−1)a
√
ηµ|2)
=
ptestN
1 + ξ/2
[
1− (−1)m+1
(
ξ/2
1 + r(1 + ξ/2)
)m+1]
.
(110)
Under these assumptions, the key rate Gˆ for each
transmissivity η is optimized over two coefficients (κ, γ)
and four protocol parameters (µ, xth, psig, ptest) as dis-
cussed in the main part. The cost of bit error correction
HEC is assumed to be 1.1 × Nˆ such(ebit), where the bit
error rate ebit is given by
ebit =
P−
P+ + P−
. (111)
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